Montenegro¶
The Montenegrin case shows a legislature disposing of a constitutional judge outside the procedure meant to protect judges from it. Reforms written for accession sit beside patronage networks long tied to the former ruling party and to organised crime, and institutions change their form while keeping their owners. Where public trust in the courts is low, a parliament can act against the court that reviews it at little political cost.
The clerk’s briefs¶
From the clerks, for the Patrician’s eyes
Worth a look. The Constitutional Court’s judges, and those who come before them, now know that parliament can remove a judge outside the procedure, and parliament’s opponents have most to lose. Networks able to buy influence, at home or from abroad, find a court that can be reshaped by vote. Accession pressure from Brussels could undo it; a later majority could repeat it.
December 2024: A judge retired by parliament¶
On 17 December 2024 Montenegro’s parliament decided on the retirement of a Constitutional Court judge, a decision the European Commission’s 2025 rule of law report says “was not in line with the procedure” and which caused “a deep institutional and political crisis”, raising concerns about the court’s independence. The same report records that 26 per cent of the public and 35 per cent of companies rated the independence of courts and judges fairly or very good in 2025. The clerks note that parliament retired a judge of the court that reviews parliament.